

SPEAKER: Maegan Fairchild (University of Southern California)

TITLE: Properties and Plenitudinous Metaphysics

ABSTRACT: The theorist convinced by the arguments for a plenitudinous metaphysics (for example, that admitting only familiar material objects would be objectionably arbitrary) has a number of options for filling out their ontology in a principled way. I consider one under-explored family of plenitudinous views inspired by Aristotelian hylomorphism, beginning with the theory of embodiments proposed by Kit Fine. I argue that the most straightforward way of developing Fine's proposal suffers a version of Russell's Paradox, and furthermore, that the most natural restrictions of the view in response to the paradox violate a plural version of Cantor's theorem. I then examine a closely related plenitude principle (essentialist plenitude), and attempt to draw general morals for views of this kind.