

Patricia Marino

Department of Logic and Philosophy of Science
University of California, Irvine
Irvine, CA 92697-5100
949-824-1520
pmarino@uci.edu

1405 Palo Verde Rd.
Irvine, CA 92612
949-823-9744
716-881-6788

Education

University of California Irvine, pursuing a PhD in Philosophy, through the Department of Logic and Philosophy of Science, 1997-present. Dissertation: Language and the World: Correspondence versus Deflationary Theories of Truth. Dissertation Committee: Penelope Maddy (Chair), Alan Nelson, and P. Kyle Stanford.

State University of New York at Buffalo, MA Mathematics, 1997

Tulane University, MS Mathematics, 1992

Wesleyan University, BA Mathematics, 1989

Areas of Specialization: Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Mathematics, Ethics

Areas of Competence: Logic, Philosophy of Science, Epistemology

Teaching Experience

University of California, Irvine: Departments of Philosophy and Logic and Philosophy of Science, Teaching Assistant, courses in general philosophical problems, contemporary moral problems, logic, and critical thinking, 1998-2001

Bennington College: July Program (summer program for high-school students), Instructor, Philosophy and Mathematics, 1998 and 1999

State University of New York at Buffalo: Medical School, Instructor, calculus review for Medical School Post-Baccalaureate Program, 1997

State University of New York at Buffalo: Department of Mathematics, Lecturer, courses in calculus and mathematics fundamentals, 1995-1997

State University of New York at Buffalo: Department of Mathematics, Teaching Assistant, courses in calculus, advanced calculus, real analysis, and proof techniques, 1992-1995

Tulane University: Department of Mathematics, Teaching Assistant, courses in calculus, advanced calculus, and differential equations, 1990-1992

Honors

University of California, Irvine, Regents' Dissertation Fellowship, Winter 2002
University of California, Irvine, School of Social Science Summer Dissertation Fellowship, 2001
University of California, Irvine, School of Social Science Summer Fellowship, 1999
University of California, Irvine, Humanities Pre-Doctoral Fellowship, 1997-present

Presentations

"Moral Dilemmas and Moral Progress," Southern California Philosophy Conference, 1999

Publications

"Moral Dilemmas, Collective Responsibility, and Moral Progress," Philosophical Studies, forthcoming

References

Professor Penelope Maddy, Department of Logic and Philosophy of Science, University of California, Irvine
Professor Alan Nelson, Department of Philosophy, University of California, Irvine
Professor P. Kyle Stanford, Department of Logic and Philosophy of Science, University of California, Irvine
Professor Ruth Marcus, Department of Philosophy, Yale University
Professor Robert May, Department of Linguistics, University of California, Irvine
Professor Matthew Foreman, Department of Mathematics, University of California, Irvine
Professor Jeffrey Barrett, Department of Logic and Philosophy of Science, University of California, Irvine

Dissertation Abstract

My dissertation concerns theories of truth; in particular, it deals with the debate between those who advocate a robust, correspondence account -- truth is correspondence to reality -- and those who urge a weak, deflationary one -- "truth" isn't a property at all, but merely a logical device. I trace the development of these two extremes, revealing the underlying points of contention, and arguing for a robust theory. A central move in my argument is the articulation of a new correspondence theory, one that overcomes traditional objections. It does so by taking scientific uses as paradigmatic, and giving indirect, context-sensitive accounts of language-world relationships, thus turning away from the heavy metaphysics of familiar correspondence theories. I call this the "physical correspondence theory" of truth. I then argue that recent deflationist responses to objections can be read in two ways, giving two brands of deflationism. The first reading yields a "physical deflationism," which is just the physical correspondence theory with some different labeling; on the basis of these small differences, I plump for the latter. The second reading yields a "discourse deflationism." I show that on this reading, the deflationary responses are not quite sufficient. Thus, I distinguish two types of deflationism and conclude that the physical correspondence theory is preferable to both.

