Logic & Philosophy of Science

Colloquium


Peter Vanderschraaf
Department of Philosophy
Carnegie Mellon University

“Instituting the Hobbesian Commonwealth”

In Leviathan and De Cive, Hobbes distinguishes between two accounts of the origins of a commonwealth. A commonwealth established by force, say by conquest or by coup, is a commonwealth by acquisition. A commonwealth established by the mutual agreement of individuals in their natural condition of political freedom is a commonwealth by institution (Hobbes 1651). In this paper, I consider exactly what is involved in commonwealth by institution and how well it serves as an element of Hobbes' political theory. First, I review Hobbes' account of commonwealth by institution in Leviathan and try to fill in the gaps Hobbes leaves behind in his own account. Second, I consider several objections to the idea of commonwealth by institution. Hobbes is frequently criticized for introducing commonwealth by institution into his overall argument, both on the grounds that actual commonwealths are not created by institution, and because a commonwealth could only be instituted by parties who have a decisive reason to comply with the agreement they make, which on Hobbes' view they won't. I disagree with these criticisms, but raise another criticism, namely, that the parties apparently would be unable to decide how to decide who to authorize as the sovereign of their commonwealth at the onset, unless they resort to choosing their sovereign at random. I conclude that this odd claim may actually cohere better with Hobbes' overall theory than Hobbes' claim that parties would choose their sovereign by election, although it may make one less inclined to accept commonwealth by institution as a tool for moral justification, as Hobbes wants to. Finally, I consider the possibility of making commonwealth by institution more plausible by relaxing one of Hobbes' premises. Hobbes draws and uses a conclusion most now regard as empirically false, namely, that rational individuals will always regard monarchy as the strictly best form of commonwealth. I conclude that if State of Nature parties do not have a strict preference for monarchy, they might be inclined to vote for, and thus institute, a democratic commonwealth.

Friday, May 21, 1999
12:00 p.m. SST 777


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