Abstract:
In an article for Carnap's Schilpp volume, Gödel argued that the Conventionalism of Carnap's Syntax program cannot avoid commitment to logical/mathematical content. Gödel held that content was intuited objectively, which seems to contradict Conventionalism. A closer inspection of conventions shows that they are not so arbitrary as Carnap indicated in 1934 with his Principle of Tolerance. First of all, conventions are not subjective, since they are actually multilateral agreements; second, such agreements can be quite stable and reliable, thus objective in a sense like the correctness of empirical observation. Third, conventions even "reveal" intuitions. In conclusion, it is possible in general, and very likely in particular areas, that conventions of "working" logicians and mathematicians support Platonism in a sense related to that of Gödel. Thus Conventionalism is compatible with Platonism.