Logic & Philosophy of Science Colloquium


Wayne Wright
  California State University, Long Beach

"Perception, color, and realism"


A major reason philosophers have addressed the issue of color realism is its apparent relevance to perception theory. An account of the nature of color should tell us what, if anything, we see when we are subject to color experiences. Thus resolving the color realism debate is expected to make a foundational  contribution to the sciences that are concerned with color phenomena. This paper argues that the traditional debate over color realism, at least with respect to its supposed relevance to empirical research on perception, is a product of embracing a faulty understanding of certain important aspects of actual scientific practice. Those misunderstandings are mutually reinforcing with a widely held commitment to a suspect conception of our perceptual systems. This paper spells out the role these errors play in the philosophical literature on color and exposes their failings.

Friday, October 13, 2006
SST 777
3 pm

Refreshments will be served