Much can be learnt about Carnap's
logical empiricism at the time of Logical
by examining his responses to Quine's criticisms of the
distinction is in many ways central to Carnap's philosophy, so his
it should be illuminating.
historian Thomas Ricketts has offered an interpretation of Logical
that is based upon these responses, however the
picture that emerges from his work is incomplete.
are significant projects in and around Logical Syntax
that cannot be accounted
for on this view.
interpretation, offered by Michael Friedman and Alan Richardson and
upon Carnap's responses to Quine, does claim to account for the
However, the position
that Friedman and Richardson describe is in conflict with the responses
they give to Quine.
These authors are
too hasty to assimilate Carnap to a neo-Kantian position, and by doing
are lead to misappropriate Ricketts' response to Quine.
We are left with a reading that is either
incomplete or inconsistent.
The point of
my talk today is to clarify what exactly is going on in Logical
Carnap up to, and what role does the analytic/synthetic distinction
These questions I answer by
proposing that Carnap need not be understood as exclusively engaged in
projects outlined by Ricketts or Friedman/Richardson.
Rather, I offer a new perspective for
understanding Carnap's philosophy, that of "linguistic engineering."