Logic & Philosophy of Science Colloquium


 

Laura Franklin-Hall
  Columbia University

“A Third Way? Prospects for Modular Anti-Reductionism in Developmental Biology”

Abstract:

A central concern of physicalist, anti-reductionism is to make sense of the autonomy of the putatively non-reducible higher level science. Alex Rosenberg has argued that contemporary developmental biology holds out no hope for such autonomy and that development is reducible to molecular biology. Here I argue, against Rosenberg, that central examples of developmental explanation are functional and fail to satisfy standard reductionist desiderata. I also suggest an alternative way of understanding the irreducibility of developmental biology in terms of modules, the super-molecular parts which some biologists hypothesize are the real causes of developmental change. These modules are above the molecular level yet still play a part in explanations of developmental events, potentially providing the autonomy needed to support physicalist anti-reductionism while avoiding a lapse into mysticism.



Friday, May 25, 2007
SST 777
3 pm

Refreshments will be served




©