Abstract:
In a
posthumously published paper Tensed Quantifiers David Lewis
gave a novel argument against presentism. He claimed that using
standard tense-operators we cannot assign credible logical forms to
sentences like 'There were five kings named George', and that
consequently we should accept that such sentences involve genuine
quantification over past entities. I argue that the argument
overgenerates: if this sort of consideration were enough to show the
existence of past entities, analogous arguments could be used to show
the existence of merely possible or imaginary entities. So the problem
calls for a general semantic analysis, not for a quick metaphysical
appraisal. Then I argue that, despite appearances, 'There were five
kings named George' quantifies over states, not objects, and
that there is a perfectly general semantic mechanism that explains the
shift. This does not by itself remove the challenge Lewis's argument
poses for the presentist but it opens up new possibilities to confront
it.