Logic & Philosophy of Science Colloquium


Mark Balaguer
California State University, Los Angleles

"Indexical Propositions and De Re Belief Ascriptions"


I develop here a novel version of the Fregean view of belief ascriptions (i.e., sentences of the form ‘S believes that p’) and I explain how my view accounts for various problem cases that many philosophers have supposed are incompatible with Fregeanism. The so-called problem cases involve (a) what Perry calls essential indexicals and (b) de re ascriptions in which it is acceptable to substitute coreferential but non-synonymous terms in belief contexts. I also respond to two traditional worries about what the sense of a proper name could be, and I explain how my view provides intuitively pleasing solutions to Kripke’s ‘London’–‘Londres’ puzzle and his Paderewski puzzle. Finally, in addition to defending my view, I also argue very briefly against Russellian alternatives to Fregeanism.

A copy of the paper can be downloaded from the "articles in advance" page of the Synthese website:

Friday, October 22, 2004
SST 777
3 pm

Refreshments will be served