Logic & Philosophy of Science Colloquium

On a correspondence theory, the truth of a sentence consists in its standing in a special relationship - correspondence - to the way things are in the world. Deflationism denies this: truth, its advocates say, is merely a grammatical device, to aid us in endorsing sentences. I argue that the difference between these is not what it seems, and that a correspondence theory is right. First, I develop a "physical correspondence theory," which avoids the problems traditionally associated with truth-as-correspondence. I then turn to objections to deflationism. From responses to these I develop two versions of that view. The first, "physical deflationism," is just the physical correspondence theory in an unfortunate disguise. The second, "discourse deflationism," is more radical and less plausible than deflationism has seemed. I conclude that the physical correspondence theory is preferable to both, and discuss some implications of adopting it.