Logic & Philosophy of Science Colloquium
"A New Kind of Victory for Truth as Correspondence"
On a correspondence theory, the truth of a sentence consists in its
standing in a special relationship - correspondence - to the way things
are in the world. Deflationism denies this: truth, its advocates say, is
merely a grammatical device, to aid us in endorsing sentences. I argue
that the difference between these is not what it seems, and that a
correspondence theory is right. First, I develop a "physical
correspondence theory," which avoids the problems traditionally associated
with truth-as-correspondence. I then turn to objections to deflationism.
From responses to these I develop two versions of that view. The first,
"physical deflationism," is just the physical correspondence theory in an
unfortunate disguise. The second, "discourse deflationism," is more
radical and less plausible than deflationism has seemed. I conclude that
the physical correspondence theory is preferable to both, and discuss some
implications of adopting it.
Thursday, January 10, 2002
Refreshments will be served