ABSTRACT: In the standard histories of the philosophy of mathematics, Frege and Russell are seen as the two primary "logicists", perhaps with Carnap and Hempel as further examples, besides the more recently emerging neo-logicism of Crispin Wright, Bob Hale, and others. Occasionally, Richard Dedekind is also mentioned in this connection, although it is typically added that, insofar as he was a logicist at all, he was one in a rather different sense than Frege and Russell. In previous work (cf. my 2013 article, "Frege, Dedekind, and the Origins of Logicism") I have started to complicate this picture, by arguing that the original motivation for Dedekind's logicism was closer to Frege's than often assumed. In the present talk I will probe this issue further, by reconsidering which notions Dedekind took to be basic, why they might or might not be considered purely "logical", and what this reveals about his and related foundational projects for mathematics.