P. Kyle Stanford
My research is centrally concerned with what we know and how we know it, especially in science. My interest in this subject has taken me into a wide range of fields of philosophy, including the philosophy of biology, the history of modern philosophy (especially the writings of Locke and Hume), and the philosophy of language. Much of my recent work has focused, however, on questions surrounding scientific realism, the widespread view that our best scientific theories offer descriptions of otherwise inaccessible domains of nature that are at least probably and/or approximately true. In Exceeding Our Grasp (OUP, 2006), I argued that the most serious challenge to this view is posed by what I called the problem of unconceived alternatives. This problem arises because we choose from among competing fundamental scientific theories the one that offers the best explanation of the available evidence as the one in which our credence will be invested, but the historical record of scientific inquiry itself reveals that we routinely fail to conceive of all the theoretical possibilities that are well-confirmed by the evidence available to us before we do so, including alternative possibilities that will ultimately replace the one we have accepted on the strength of that evidence. This historical pattern constitutes the best reason we have, I suggest, to believe that there are probably fundamentally distinct alternatives to even the best contemporary scientific theories that are also well-confirmed by the evidence we now have, including some that will ultimately replace contemporary theories in the course of further inquiry, but that nonetheless remain unconceived by scientists and scientific communities of the present day. I suggest that the central remaining question concerns just where and when this problem should and should not lead us to regard fundamental scientific theories simply as powerful instruments for mediating our interactions with otherwise inaccessible domains of nature, rather than literally accurate descriptions of such domains. In this connection I have recently argued that specific features of the institutional context and incentive structure of modern professionalized science actually render us more vulnerable to this problem of unconceived alternatives as compared with scientific communities of the past, but the problem does not pose an equally significant challenge to theorizing in all scientific fields or for every sort of scientific research. In more recent work I have also sought to integrate this view of scientific theories with a much broader empiricist and pragmatist vision of human cognitive activity, one that recognizes the phylogenetic continuity between our own cognitive resources and those developed and deployed by other organisms, and one that sees human cognition as a resource for getting along and around in the world more generally. I suggest that many persistent philosophical puzzles about language, intentionality, and morality take on a very different character if we recognize distinctive capacities such as thought and language as resources evolved in lineages of creatures like us for successfully navigating a world like the one we inhabit, and if we come to regard scientific inquiry itself simply as the most sophisticated, organized, and systematic application we have of those very capacities.
Resources for Students:
- Current/Most Recent Syllabus for Social Science Honors
- Current/Most Recent Syllabus for Philosophy of Biology
- Current/Most Recent Syllabus for Philosophy of Law
- The Seven Deadly Sins of Argumentative Writing
- Academic Honesty Form
- Graduate Seminars
(2006). Exceeding Our Grasp: Science, History, and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives. New York: Oxford University Press.
Reviewed in Science, Philosophy of Science, Mind, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, British Journal for the History of Science, Isis, Biology and Philosophy, History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences, International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Review of Metaphysics, Choice, Skeptical Inquirer.
- (1995). “For Pluralism and Against Realism About Species”, Philosophy of Science 62: 70-91.
- (1998). “Reference and Natural Kind Terms: The Real Essence of Locke’s View”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79: 78-97.
- Reprinted in Peter R. Anstey, ed., John Locke: Critical Assessments of Leading Philosophers, 4 vols. Abingdon: Routledge, 2006.
- (2000; lead author, with Philip Kitcher). “Refining the Causal Theory of Reference for Natural Kind Terms”, Philosophical Studies 97: 99-129.
- (2000). “An Antirealist Explanation of the Success of Science”, Philosophy of Science 67: 266-284.
- (2001). “Refusing the Devil’s Bargain: What Kind of Underdetermination Should We Take Seriously?”, Philosophy of Science 68 (Proceedings): S1-S12.
- (2001). “The Units of Selection and the Causal Structure of the World”, Erkenntnis 54: 215-233.
- (2002). “The Manifest Connection: Causation, Meaning and David Hume”, Journal of the History of Philosophy 40: 339-360.
- (2003). “No Refuge for Realism: Selective Confirmation and the History of Science”, Philosophy of Science 70: 913-925.
- (2003). “Pyrrhic Victories for Scientific Realism”, Journal of Philosophy 100: 553-572.
- (2005). “August Weismann’s Theory of the Germ-Plasm and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives”, History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 27: 163-199.
- (2006). “Francis Galton’s Stirp Theory of Inheritance and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives”, Biology and Philosophy 21: 523-536.
- (2006). “Darwin’s Pangenesis and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57: 121-144.
- (2009). “Scientific Realism, the Atomic Theory, and the Catch-All Hypothesis: Can We Test Fundamental Theories Against All Serious Alternatives?”, British Journal For The Philosophy of Science 60: 253-269.
- (forthcoming, Nov. 2009). “Grasping at Realist Straws: Author’s Response” from Syposium Review of Exceeding Our Grasp: Science, History, and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives (New York, Oxford University Press, 2006), Metascience.
(in press). “Instrumentalism” in The Philosophy of Science: An Encyclopedia, ed. Sahotra Sarkar and Jessica Pfeifer. New York: Routledge (3000 wds).
(in press, with Jeff Barrett). “Prediction” in The Philosophy of Science: An Encyclopedia, ed. Sahotra Sarkar and Jessica Pfeifer. New York: Routledge (7000 wds).
(2009). “Underdetermination of Scientific Theories” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta.
(1999). “Preaching to the Choir? Robert Klee and the Latest Face of Scientific Realism” (Essay Review of Klee's Cutting Nature at its Seams: Introduction to the Philosophy of Science), Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science 30: 367-375.
(2001). Review of Elliott Sober and David Sloan Wilson’s Unto Others: The Evolution and Psychology of Unselfish Behavior. Journal of Philosophy 98: 43-47.
(2008). Review of Hanne Anderson, Peter Barker, and Xiang Chen, The Cognitive Structure of Scientific Revolutions, British Journal of the History of Science 41: 116-117.
(forthcoming). [Title TBD.] Symposium Review of James Ladyman and Donald Ross, Everything Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalized (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), Metascience.