| Description: |
Many of us take for granted that our main access to the world
is
perceptual: we see, taste, touch, hear, and smell the world. The
central question of this course is, How does perception give us access
to
the world? Is it direct? Are the direct objects of perception
physical objects? If so, when I see a tomato, I am in direct
perceptual contact with it. What does it even mean to say that I
perceive an object directly? And what if I’m having the exact same
experience that I have when I see a tomato, but I’m actually
hallucinating a tomato? In the hallucination, I’m directly aware
of
something, but it isn’t a physical red tomato. Does this show
that
perception requires some kind of intermediary entitythat I don’t
have
direct perceptual access to physical objects? What is the
phenomenology of perceptual experience? When I examine my
experience, what do I find? Consider seeing a red tomato on the
table. It certainly seems true that this visual experience is
representing the world as being a certain wayit has
representational
content. How do we adequately characterize the content of
perception? Do perceptual experiences have a kind of content over
and above representational content, something it’s like to have the
experience? |