Logic & Philosophy of Science Colloquium

1) A survey of historical evidence currently available concerning Wittgenstein¹s attitude toward, and knowledge of, Gödel¹s first incompleteness theorem, including his discussions with Turing, Watson and others in 1937-1939, and later testimony of Goodstein and Kreisel, as well as some recently discovered 1941 remarks of Wittgenstein's on w-inconsistency and "self-reference"; 2) Discussion of the philosophical and historical importance of Wittgenstein¹s attitude toward Gödel¹s and other theorems in mathematical logic; 3) Replies to an instructive criticism of my early 1995 treatment of topics 1) and 2) by Mark Steiner, focussing on the importance of Tarski¹s semantical work, both for our understanding of Wittgenstein¹s remarks on Gödel, and our understanding of Gödel¹s theorem itself. 4) Comments on recent work with Putnam on the philosophical significance of Wittgenstein's remarks on Gödel.