Abstract:
I develop here a novel version of
the Fregean view of belief ascriptions (i.e., sentences of the form ‘S believes
that p’) and I explain how my view accounts for various problem cases that
many philosophers have supposed are incompatible with Fregeanism. The so-called
problem cases involve (a) what Perry calls essential indexicals and (b) de re
ascriptions in which it is acceptable to substitute coreferential but non-synonymous
terms in belief contexts. I also respond to two traditional worries about
what the sense of a proper name could be, and I explain how my view provides
intuitively pleasing solutions to Kripke’s ‘London’–‘Londres’ puzzle and
his Paderewski puzzle. Finally, in addition to defending my view, I also
argue very briefly against Russellian alternatives to Fregeanism.
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