Abstract:
In order to lie, you have to say something that
you believe to be false (Costanza 1995). But lying is not simply
saying what you
believe to be false. Philosophers have made several suggestions
for what the additional condition might be. For example,
it has been
suggested that the liar has to intend to deceive (Augustine
395, Bok 1978, Mahon 2006), that she has to believe that she will
deceive
(Chisholm and Feehan 1977), or that she has to warrant the
truth of what she says (Carson 2006). In this talk, I argue
that none of the
existing definitions of lying identify a necessary condition
on lying. I claim that lying is saying what you believe to be false
when you
believe that the following norm of conversation is in
effect: "Do not say what you believe to be false" (Grice 1989,
27). And I argue that
this definition handles all of the counter-examples to the
existing definitions.