Abstract:
Nano-sized objects cannot be seen by you and I, not merely
because they do not create an intense enough signal to be detected by human
eyes, but because they are smaller than visible wavelengths of light. But then
of what is an image of a nano-sized object an image? Of what could it be an image?
Why do we bother to make images of them?
Beginning with these questions, and taking a cue from some recent
debates about van Fraassen’s distinction between the observable and
unobservable, as well as work in neuroscience and cognitive science, I will
argue for a conception of observation that leads to a view of physical theories
according to which physical theories are fundamentally and in principle (and
not merely as a matter of fact) about the manner in which we human beings
happen to observe the world, constrained by how we are cognitively constructed. This conception of observation plays nicely
with some of the observations (pun intended) that figure most prominently in
Bohr’s discussions of quantum theory. In
particular, I will suggest that a variation on Bohr’s insistence on the
necessity of ‘classical concepts’ may be defensible. Finally, in case I haven’t yet offended
everybody’s philosophical sensibilities, I will suggest that an approach to
quantum theory based on these considerations might successfully dissolve the
measurement problem. Although based on
some technical work, this talk will be non-technical.